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bstract
private company has several options in the job market, such as hiring, outsourcing, or dismissing employees. The management flexibility
f dismissing employees, even without just cause, provides an economic benefit for companies. By addressing real options, this study aims to
easure the effects of this flexibility on the employer’s decision to hire more employees as well as to invest in the more productive employees
hrough graduate incentives. This article evaluates the adverse impacts of labor laws that restrict this flexibility, such as the Severance Indemnity
und (FGTS) fine and the prior notice of termination of employment, in order to find out how much the employee adds value to the company and,
onsequently, to its salary. Using this methodology, this study also evaluates, from the employer’s perspective, the relevance and value maximization
f the company’s financial support programs for employees taking graduate courses. Results show that severance costs reduce the net value of the
mployee to the employer. Should these costs be disconsidered and the benefit in value transferred to the employee this could be equivalent in a
.5% increase in salary. Likewise the possibility of investing in graduate course at the correct moment but only for the more productive employees
an increase their net value significantly, doubling the net value of the employee to the employer.
2017 Departamento de Administração, Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade da Universidade de São Paulo – FEA/USP.
ublished by Elsevier Editora Ltda. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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esumos empresas privadas têm diversas opções no mercado de trabalho tais como contratar, terceirizar ou dispensar empregados. A flexibilidade gerencial
e poder demitir empregados, mesmo sem justa causa, gera um benefício econômico para as empresas. Usando a abordagem de Opções Reais,
este trabalho procurou-se mensurar os efeitos desta flexibilidade na decisão do empregador em contratar mais empregados, assim como, investir
os empregados mais produtivos por meio de programas de pós-graduação. Nesta pesquisa avaliou-se os efeitos adversos das leis trabalhistas que
estringem essa flexibilidade, tais como a multa do FGTS e do aviso prévio, de forma a determinar o quanto o empregado adiciona de valor para a
mpresa e, consequentemente, ao seu salário. Utilizando essa abordagem procurou-se avaliar pela ótica do empregado, a relevância e maximização
e valor criada pelos programas de incentivo a cursos de pós-graduação. Os resultados mostraram que os custos de demissão reduzem o valor∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail: sbarros@ibmec.edu.br (S.D. Barros).
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do empregado para o empregador. Ao desconsiderar estes e transferindo os benefícios diretamente ao empregado, resultaria em incremento de
4,5% no salário deste. Outrossim, a possibilidade de investir numa pós-graduação no momento oportuno, mas somente para os empregados mais
produtivos, pode aumentar valor do empregado de forma significativa, duplicando este para o empregador.
© 2017 Departamento de Administração, Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade da Universidade de São Paulo – FEA/USP.
Publicado por Elsevier Editora Ltda. Este é um artigo Open Access sob uma licença CC BY (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

















































































Company decisions to hire, train, or dismiss employees are
nfluenced by the employer’s expectations about how much the
mployee will contribute in generating cash flow for the com-
any, similar to the decision to invest in an asset. Hiring an
mployee may generate revenue for the company; however, it
lso comes with a cost. Similar to other investment decisions,
he decision to hire an employee comes with some uncertainty
elated to the employee’s performance (his labor supply) as well
s the amount that his services are used (demand for labor). It
s valid to investigate whether the decisions to hire or dismiss
mployees, in light of the volatility of the company’s demand,
re made considering the value of management flexibility of
iring or dismissing employees.
During an economic crisis, it is very common for mass lay-
ffs to occur because the labor cost is higher than the value
f its economic production. Since the social cost of unemploy-
ent is very high, especially the cost of maintaining the living
onditions of unemployed people and their families, the labor
aws of several countries impose costs when the work contract is
erminated without just cause in order to discourage this action.
In Brazil, the main obligations are the prior notice of termina-
ion of employment and the Severance Indemnity Fund (FGTS)
ne. The latter, paid by the company that decides to fire employ-
es without just cause, is equivalent to about 4% of the sum of
he salaries received by the employee (40% fine to the dismissed
mployee, plus 10% fine to the government, both on 8% of all
alaries reviewed to date – FGTS accumulated value, amounting
o around 4% of all salaries received). The former, when paid to
he employee, has a value equal to the sum of the salaries and
ther labor rights proportional to the period of 30 days plus three
ays for each year of service to the company.
However, even if these costs are effective in reducing the
umber of dismissals, they also tend to negatively affect the
ecision to hire, as will be investigated in this study. Thus, in
ormal economic situations, both the level of employment as
ell as the salaries are smaller when there is not total flexibil-
ty to lay off employees. Furthermore, the costs for terminating
he employment relationship increases the incentive for labor
utsourcing.
The employers must understand the effects of management
nflexibility when dismissing employees in order to make the
orrect decision when hiring. Furthermore, it is essential to ana-
yze the cost–benefit of public policies that affect the flexibility




abor laws on companies when the work contract is terminated
ithout just cause serve to protect workers against a dismissal
ot initiated by the employee. The receipt of 40% of the total
eposits made to the employee’s FGTS account during the work
ontract is a boost to the newly-unemployed person and his fam-
ly. However, companies may lose interest in hiring employees
ue to these costs, and this is not as easy to observe or measure.
In order to investigate the adverse impacts of labor laws that
estrict flexibility of dismissing employees, this article adopts
he real options analysis methodology for two purposes, one
ain and a secondary objective. These are modeled as synthe-
ized in Table 1 and further explained in Chapter 4. As a main
urpose, the dismissal option is analyzed in four different sce-
arios. Two of them, real cases in Brazil: dismissal with FGTS
ne and indemnified proportional prior notice (in force since
ctober 13, 2011) and dismissal with FGTS fine and indemni-
ed 30-day prior notice (in force before October 13, 2011). The
ther two are theoretical scenarios: dismissal with FGTS fine
nly and unrestricted dismissal. This paper seeks to compare
he results in order to measure the undesired effects of reduced
mployee value for the company, which may cause an adverse
ffect on hiring new employees or on the salary amount of each
f these components.
Secondly, as a secondary purpose, this article also uses real
ptions theory to analyzing the business option of funding grad-
ate courses for their best-performing employees in order to
ncourage them to increase their performance. This option will
e investigated under the assumption that it is an expensive
nvestment and that it will raise the salary of the employee
elected for the course. This study shows the difference between
program that offers financial support for graduate studies to
ll employees when they enter the company and a program that
iews the incentive as an option to be given only when the com-
any expects that the chosen employee will bring a financial
eturn on that investment and at a time that maximizes his net
resent value.
All major characteristics and approaches used in the article
re listed in Table 1.
This article is divided into six sections. The theoretical frame-
ork is presented after the introduction, giving a review of the
xisting literature on the real options theory and the labor laws
elated to dismissal without just cause. The third section analyzes
iring, training, and dismissal without just cause generically as
ell as with a focus on Brazil. The fourth section describes the
ethodology used to estimate the value of the dismissal options
nd the support for graduate studies as well as to calculate the
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Table 1
Modeled options.
Dismissal option Incentive for graduate studies option
Type American put American call
Owner Employer Employer
Underlying asset Present value of net marginal contribution of employee Present value of net marginal contribution of employee
Uncertain variable Quantity of goods sold marginally by the employee Quantity of goods sold marginally by the employee
Acquisition price Free of charge Free of charge
Exercise costs Four scenarios are studied Tuition costs
Expiration date 10 years after hiring 10 years after hiring
Decision timeframe All assessments and decisions are taken quarterly by the firm All assessments and decisions are taken quarterly by the firm
Number of options One (the employee may only be fired once) One (as a simplifying assumption, there is only one graduate
course to be chosen)





































































of option at time t of employee after dismissal, if negative
ource: Authors.
mpact of the costs of terminating the work contract on the value
f the marginal economic benefit expected from the employee.
he fifth section presents the results and examines the sensitiv-
ty of the results with the main parameters of the model. Finally,
he last section presents the conclusions of this study for Brazil,
heir delimitations, and suggestions for further works.
heoretical framework
This section gives a review of the literature about the real
ptions analysis and of labor laws with a focus on Brazil.
eal options analysis
When a company decides whether or not to hire an employee,
iring will incur in costs with an expectation of future rewards.
he employer, even intuitively, creates an expectation of that
mployee’s productivity. This makes the decision to hire an
mployee similar to the decision to invest in an asset. Tradi-
ionally, the cash flow is discounted for the valuation of assets,
hich, according to Brigham and Ehrhardt (2002), consists in
stimating and discounting the future cash flows in order to
btain the net present value (NPV) of the asset. However, this
echnique does not adequately consider the existence of man-
gement flexibilities, which often involve long-term investment
ecisions.
When an agent has the right, but not the obligation to take
particular action, it is called an option. Usually the options
ave a previously defined cost to be able to obtain them. One
xample is the cost to adapt a factory in order to provide it with
he flexibility to produce different types of products. On the other
and, there are also less frequent cases in which a free option can
e taken, but when put into action is considered expensive. This
s the case with the option to lay off an employee who is hired
y the employer. The dismissal option is free of charge, which
eans that the company does not expend any resources to obtain
his option, but must cover additional expenses when exercising
he option to dismiss the employee without just cause.
The Real Options Theory, first registered by Myers (1977),
dapts the financial options theory of Black–Scholes (1973) in




rst time a Real Options model to evaluate an investment in
reserve of non-renewable natural resources. The first books
ully dedicated to the topic were published during the 1990s.
ixit and Pindyck (1994) developed analyses of investments
nder conditions of uncertainty and during a continuous time.
eisbrod (1962) analyzes the labor market using an analogy
ith the options theory, later extended in Comay, Melnika, and
ollatschekm (1973).
It is important to note that, although the first articles that used
he real options methodology were mainly devoted to financial
nalyses in the industrial sector, more recently the real options
heory has been used in several other areas.
More recently still, the methodology began being applied
n studies related to human resources. Dockner and Siyahhan
2011) interrelate the investment in human capital with the value
f risky R&D projects. Trigeorgis and Baldi (2012) develop
n alternative real options framework based on the flexibility
f human capital. Brady (2014) analyzes the strategic use of
eal options for temporary work contracts. Santos, Brandão, and
aia (2015) use the real options methodology to analyze the
hoice between a career in a private and one in a public agency.
owever, no other study has used the real options theory to
valuate the impact that the cost of dismissal without just cause
as on the employee’s value and on hiring new employees, which
s the main objective of this paper.
The Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979) binomial model is
sually adopted for the real options analysis and is based on the
reation of recombinant binomial trees (or lattices) that deter-
ine the paths that the price of the asset evaluated follows until
he time of expiration of the real option. From each point in
iscrete-time (n), the uncertain variable (Q) can either increase
r decrease by a ratio given by u (up) and d (down) respec-
ively, whose probabilities of occurrence are, respectively, p and
1 − p), as can be seen in Fig. 1.
When Qt follows a Brownian geometric motion as demon-
trated by Hull (2009), the values of u, d, and p originally
roposed by Cox et al. (1979) for the binomial tree (lattice)
hat prevent arbitrage and allow a risk neutral valuation are
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u − d (3)
The option value is estimated starting at the end of the pro-
ected lattice by maximizing the results of exerting the option
r not: maximum (Qt; Xt); where Qt is the value of the under-
ying asset at each point of the last period of the lattice, and Xt
he exercise value at that point. Then, stepping back one prior,
aximization is again estimated, adding also the possibility of
sing the continuation value as shown in Fig. 2.
The maximizing of results at each point of the binomial tree
s now (4).
t = max[Xt ; (Q+t+1 × p + Q−t+1 × (1 − p))e−rΔt] (4)
Recursively applying this method up to the start period of the
inomial tree allows the value of the real options to be estimated.
abor laws
According to Heckman and Pagés (1996), it is common for
eforms that increase workers’ rights to occur in periods imme-
iately following a country’s return to democracy. Brazil, which
eturned to democracy in 1985 and promulgated a new Con-
titution in 1988, has experienced in this new Magna Carta a
onsiderable increase in the number of penalties for dismissing
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nitial value according to Barros and Corseuil (2004). This same
aper, by means of econometric studies, did not find any signifi-
ant evidence of the impact on the demand for labor in Brazil due
o these changes in the labor laws. However, it found fluctuations
n the coefficients, which could be explained by macroeconomic
vents. The authors pointed out, however, that their results did
ot necessarily mean that there were not any effects. Because
f this, they believe that further studies have to be made on this
ubject to arrive at a definitive conclusion.
The FGTS is a compensation fund for dismissals without just
ause. According to the summary made by Barros and Corseuil
2004), it is a type of social security fund in which the employee
ccumulates resources while he is employed. The deposits in
he employee’s FGTS account are done every month with a
alue equal to 8% of the remuneration paid or payable during
he previous month. The remuneration includes commissions,
hristmas bonus (13th salary), and the constitutional vacation
onus (a third of a salary while on vacation), among others. The
mounts deposited in the account are increased 3% per year over
he reference rate, which is, by definition, positively correlated
ith the fixed rates charged by the 30 largest financial institu-
ions in the country in their bank certificates of deposit. When
n employee is dismissed without just cause, he is entitled to
ithdraw the funds present in his FGTS account, as well as an
dditional amount equivalent to 40% of the funds deposited by
he employer during the employee’s term of the work contract
FGTS fine).
According to Noronha (2000), the FGTS has eliminated job
tability in Brazil. Furthermore, Souza (2007) states that the
und was created in order to gradually eliminate employment
tability in the country. However, it is important to note that this
nly refers to employees subject to the legal system of Consoli-
ated Labor Laws (CLT), so for civil servants and magistrates in
razil there is still ample stability, which is why this article also
iscusses the case of the absence of the option for the employer
o dismiss employees.
Each country has the autonomy to regulate the labor rela-
ions present in its territory. Some are more liberal, while others
mpose burdens on the employer when the work contract is
erminated without just cause. In Brazil, in addition to the afore-
entioned 40% of the total deposits made to the employee’s
GTS account during the work contract, the employer must
ay another 10% of the same calculation basis to the Federal
overnment (social contribution), totaling a fine equivalent to
0% of the total deposits bearing interest. Furthermore, the
rior notice of termination of employment should be given
t least 30 days before the dismissal, which, in many cases,
eans that the company notifies the employee that it wishes
o terminate the labor contract and already exempts him from
oming to work, since the productivity of an employee that
nows he will be fired is usually very low. Yet the company
ill have to pay a salary to this employee who will not be
oming to work, characterizing an indemnified prior notice. As
rovided in the CLT, only during the first 90 days of employment
an a company terminate the employment relationship with-

























































































J.V. Perufo et al. / RAUSP Mana
Until Law 12,506/11 was published, the prior notice of ter-
ination of employment in Brazil was 30 days, regardless of
he employee’s length of service in the company. Since October
3, 2011, three days are added for each year worked, up to a
aximum of 60 days, thus totaling up to 90 days of prior notice.
his change will also be analyzed in this article.
iring, training, and dismissal without just cause
Disregarding emotional factors, the decision to hire an
mployee can be described economically as follows: if the
arginal economic benefit expected from hiring the employee
s greater than the cost, it is best to hire him. If not, then he
hould not be hired. Thus, it is necessary to define the value for
he marginal economic benefit expected that the employee will
rovide to the company as well as the value of the cost expected
ith hiring him.
arginal economic benefit expected from the employment
An employee starts to bring marginal benefit for a com-
any when the fruit of his labor (marginal productivity of labor)
xceeds his costs (salary paid to the employee plus all applicable
abor charges) including any necessary training. If the benefit is
ower than the costs, keeping the employee will bring an extra
xpense.
The best way to calculate the marginal productivity of labor
s to estimate the difference between the company’s production
ith the employee and its production without the employee. And
he cost is found by adding the applicable labor charges to the
alue of the salary in the contract.
Since the employer does not know at the time of hiring what
ill be the employee’s marginal productivity of labor, nor what
ill be the employee’s value over time, it is an expectation
ith many uncertainties. This value is affected by issues that
re intrinsic and extrinsic to the employee.
The conditions inherent to the employee are all those that
re influenced by the employee, whether consciously or uncon-
ciously. The main ones are the following: the employee’s
nterest, motivation, influence on the team (positive or nega-
ive), and his competence to achieve the results that the employer
esires, either individually or collectively.
The conditions extrinsic to the employee are all those that
ffect his productivity, but are not influenced by him. A rise or
all in demand for the product or service offered by the company,
or example, exogenously impacts the marginal productivity of
he employee because they cannot be changed by him.
However, the remuneration paid in return for labor supply
or a given function is predictable, since it is stipulated in the
ontract and usually increases according to inflation. A similar
redictability also exists when finding the value of the applicable
abor charges since they are defined in the Brazilian legislation,
lthough the law can be changed at any time.Thus, the marginal benefit to be generated by the employee
hose employment is under analysis can be calculated using
he discounted cash flow technique. If the present value of the
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mployment cost, it has a positive net present value, meaning
iring the employee is recommended. However, the discount rate
sed in discounting the present value of the cash flow is difficult
o estimate since the values of this flow are very uncertain. Fur-
hermore, this financial technique is not the best method when
he flow contains management flexibility, such as the dismissal
f the employee, which resembles an abandonment option in a
eal options valuation.
Thus, choosing a methodology that adequately addresses the
anagement flexibility will allow the value of the real option of
aying off an employee to be estimated and, therefore, how much
his flexibility increases the present value of the marginal benefit
hat the employee will generate for the company. Finally, this
dded value of the dismissal option will imply that it is more
dvantageous for the company to hire an employee, possibly
eading to the employment of more employees.
raining – support for graduate studies
Heckman, Lochnerl, and Toddp (2006) focus on the use
f options to analyze investment in human resources. Compa-
ies invest in various types of training in order to qualify their
mployees for carrying out their functions. The purpose of con-
inually qualifying employees is to maximize the results of the
ompany. Also, investing in training helps to motivate human
esources and stay in the company.
Some companies offer support programs for graduate studies
y them paying the partial or full value of a graduate course for
n employee who meets certain prerequisites usually related to
ength of service and performance in the company. Commonly,
he employee attends classes at night while working during the
ay. However, there are also cases where the employee dedicates
xclusively to taking the graduate course, taking time off from
ork while attending classes and writing his thesis paper. Neri
2005) points out several benefits for the employee due to a better
ducation, including a higher chance of getting a job and higher
alary.
mployment cost
When hiring an employee, the company pays non-recurring
osts related to recruitment, selection, hiring, medical assess-
ent, contracts, etc. The higher the desired level of education
nd experience is, the more expensive the process will be. Thus,
he employment cost is positively correlated with the salary
efined for the function.
ethodology
In order to estimate the expected marginal economic ben-
fit from hiring an employee, the methodology will consider
he employee as an asset whose estimated value is the present
alue of the marginal future cash flows that he will bring to
he employer. Included in this cash flow are the revenue that the
mployee will marginally add to the company and the costs with
alaries, labor charges, and the employee’s training. The bino-
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ill be used to analyze the real options described in Table 1,
resented in the introduction section of this paper. Finally, it is
orth mentioning that in this model the company will always
eek to maximize the employee’s marginal net present value.
he decisions of offering graduate studies to the employee and
f dismissing the employee without just cause will exclusively
bey this criterion.
The model’s time analysis for this article is divided quarterly
nd for a total of 10 years since currently Brazilian employ-
es work for less time in a particular company, causing a high
urnover, meaning that the time frame is less than the useful
ife of its labor. According to Dieese (2016), the global turnover
ate in Brazil for workers hired under the CLT legal system was
2.8% in 2014. The income tax rate applied to the company’s
ash flow will be 34%. The values in the flow are expressed in
eal terms, that is, with the quarter’s inflation discounted.
The next subsections will introduce the two modeled options
nd present the company’s marginal expenses and revenues that
rise from the decision of hiring the employee. One minus the
ther will equal the employee’s marginal economic benefit for
he company. Finally, the discount rate of the cash flow will be
ntroduced. The cash flow will be important for the estimation
f the net present value of the employee to the company, which
ill drive the flexibility decisions of the rational employer.
ismissal option
The dismissal of an employee is an abandonment option held
y the company, and will be modeled as a put option. Its equa-
ion at the expiration date is given by max{St,Xt}, where St is the
resent value of the Contribution Margin (MCt) of the employee
o the company as will be discussed in chapter ‘Revenues gener-
ted by hiring the employee’, and Xt is a function that represents
he cost of dismissing the employee an time t, according to the
tudied scenario (a lower than zero number), both at time t = 40
quarter). The value of Xt is the sum of Eqs. (6) and (7), or, in
he case of an unrestricted dismissal option Xt = 0. During the
revious quarters, the decision is either exercising the dismissal
ption for a cost of Xt or maintaining the employee, which will
e the present value of the Contribution Margin (MC) from this






During the first quarter, the option equation will be max{St=0,
} in any given scenario, because there are no severance costs
ncurred when terminating a probation contract, which may last
or up to the 90th day of the labor contract.
When carrying out the option, the company will lay off the
mployee at the time of the prior notice and shall indemnify the
mployee for the next 30 days not worked plus three days for
ach full year worked. The employer will pay him the indemnity
unds defined by the labor law: salary for these days of notice
nd the following benefits at the rate of 1/12: 13th salary, vaca-
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quivalent to 43/36 of the salary.
otice30d = Salary + Prop 13◦sal + Prop vacation bonus
+ Prop vacation
Therefore:
roportional noticen days = Notice30d × n
30
(6)
Additionally, the company must pay the FGTS of the period
hat will be indemnified and the proportional amounts of the
onstitutional vacation bonus and the 13th salary indemnified. In
his way, if the employee is fired, for example, after completing
ve years of service to the company, the prior notice will equal
5 days (30 + 5 × 3 days).
Finally, the employer must pay the FGTS fine, which will be
evied on all of the FGTS paid and payable values. In the model
f this work, it is equivalent to 4% of the sum of the salaries paid
nd payable since the employment, including the 13th salary
nd constitutional vacation bonus, corrected for inflation. This
s a reliable simplification since 40% of the FGTS paid to the
mployee plus the additional 10% paid as a social contribution
o the federal Government (according to article 1 of the Supple-
entary Law No. 110/2001) equals approximately half of 8%
f the total salary (including the 13th salary and constitutional
acation bonus) paid to the employee.
This dismissal cost will be counted as an expense to be paid
t the moment that the employee is dismissed. It is reasonable to
ssume that the salaries and the balance of the FGTS account are
djusted according to inflation indexes. In this way, the salary
nd the balance of the FGTS account, for simplification, will be
onstant in real terms in the model.
GTS finet = t × 50%
× 8% × Calculation basis of the FGTS, ∀t > 3 (7)
here t is the number of months that the employee worked for
he company, including the prior notice.
This paper will analyze not only the scenario where all these
osts exist, but also other three comparable scenarios: FGTS
ne plus indemnified prior notice restricted to 30 days (in force
efore October 13, 2011), no prior notice (only FGTS fine) and,
nally, a scenario where no costs existed. Note that the last two
cenarios are theoretical and only serve the purpose of estimating
he individual effects of each of the components of Brazilian
everance costs.
ncentive for graduate studies option
This flexibility for the employer is analog to an expansion
ption, and is therefore modeled as a call option. The function
s comparable to the previous option, but the main difference
s that the exercise of the option does not lead to a termination
f the contract. Instead, in: maximum {St, X}, the function X
or this option means the company will pay for the graduate
tudies at time t, which will imply an increase in the employee’s



























































































J.V. Perufo et al. / RAUSP Mana
f the time frame modeled, or t = 40 quarters. The amount X
hat the company will pay for the employee’s graduate studies,
f it decides to offer it, will be R$ 30,000.00. The employee will
tudy while working, which is usual in Brazil and means that he
ill not have to stop working while taking the course. The result
f the training will be reflected in the model as a 50% increase
n the employee’s productivity from time t (when the option is
xerted) until the time frame of the case studied: t = 40 (quarters).
he salary, however, will have a 66% increase for the same time
uration. In this case, the function St is the present value of the
et increase in Marginal Contribution of the employee to the
mployer from time t to 40, expiration of the option time frame,
s already described in Eq. (5). A sensitivity analysis of these
ariables will be made because the increase in productivity and
he salary increase may vary according to sector and course. Both
increase in productivity and salary) will incur in the model at
he start of the course as a simplifying assumption, for there is
o way to objectively determine the timing and how gradual the
mpact on productivity is expected to be. The results obtained
y Neri (2005) were considered when defining the values for
he base scenario of the methodology, which indicates a large
eterogeneity of types of trainings and courses that can impact
ifferently the increase in productivity and the salary increase,
hich vary around these numbers chosen for the base scenario
f the methodology.
xpenses incurred by hiring the employee
For the model, we will use the case of an employee that for-
alized a work contract for an indeterminate period and receives
monthly salary of R$ 7200.00. Generically, the employee is
onsidered a salesperson of the products manufactured by the
ompany, and to simplify the case, his remuneration is fixed.
ll of the benefits required by the labor laws of the country will
e paid to the employee. It should be noted that the 13th salary
Christmas bonus) and a third of the monthly salary while on
acation (vacation bonus) are rights that make up the calcula-
ion basis of the FGTS, meaning that the employer must pay 8%
f this amount of FGTS to the employee’s linked account. Thus,
he calculations can be simplified by provisioning the 13th salary
nd the vacation bonus every month, which ends up to be about
$ 800.00 per month.
alculation basis of the FGTS
= Salary + 13th salary + Vacation bonus (8)
alculation basis of the FGTS
= 7200.00 + 1
12





alculation basis of the FGTS = 8000.00
Thus, the monthly salary of the employee in the model, plus
he provision mentioned, above equals R$ 8000.00. This will
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odel when the annual financial entitlements are calculated
roportionally, as well as the calculation basis of the FGTS.
The hiring cost is considered half this value, which is R$
000.00. This amount is in line with current market standards,
onsidering all of the expenses incurred from recruiting candi-
ates for the job vacancy until signing the work contract. This
ill be the acquisition cost of the asset.
The amount that the company must pay every month for the
ired employee includes, in addition to the salary and benefits
hat are paid to the employee, other labor charges paid to the
overnment (INSS, education allowance, S System, etc.), and
hese vary according to what tax regime the company is regis-
ered, what economic sector it operates in, etc. We will assume
hat the company pays R$ 24,000.00 each year in labor charges,
hich means an average monthly disbursement of R$ 2000.00,
r 25% of R$ 8000.00. This 25% is in line with a study released
y the Inter-Union Department of Statistics and Socio-Economic
tudies (DIEESE), which considers the costs related to contrib-
tions to INSS, INCRA, SESI or SESC, SENAI or SENAC,
nd SEBRAE, as well as education allowance and insurance for
ccupational accidents. It is important to note that the percent-
ge is being applied on the total disbursement of the company of
$ 8000.00 per month, which already considers the 13th salary
nd the additional one third for vacation. This is why this study
as used as a reference, which is less than what is calculated
y business entities since they consider paid vacations, weekly
est, holidays, and other labor benefits in their calculation in
rder to state that an employee costs about twice his salary for
he contractor. Even if the concession of a benefit by the com-
any implies in a cost for it, this is already considered in the
abor contract and in the amount of the proposed monthly salary,
hich tends to be less than it would be if there was no vacation,
olidays, etc., therefore they are not extra expenses arising from
mploying the employee. For simplification purposes, we will
onsider a monthly disbursement of R$ 10,000.00 in the cash
ow of which R$ 8000.00 is for salary and other legal benefits
aid to the employee and R$ 2000.00 is for the labor charges
aid to the Government, even though, in practice, part of this is
rovisioned to be paid during vacations and another part is to
e paid for the 13th salary, and so on, because the company will
nvariably owe these charges.
evenues generated by hiring the employee
Since the base case being evaluated is an employee who works
n a company’s sales team, we will consider that for every prod-
ct sold, 40% of the revenue will be used to pay variable costs
nd expenses and 60% will be the contribution margin.
t = QtP
Ct = 60%Rt = 0.60QtP (9)here Rt is the marginal sales revenue generated by the employee
n quarter t, Qt is the quantity of goods sold marginally by the
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alue), MCt is the employee’s marginal contribution margin for
he company in quarter t.
The amount of units marginally sold, which is the number of
nits sold by the company as a whole beyond what it would sell
f this employee had not been hired, will follow a Wiener Process
ith a drift of 2% p.a., which is consistent with Brazilian annual
ross domestic product mean growth over the last 10 years, and
volatility of 30% p.a.
Qt = μQtdt + σQtdz (10)
hereμ is the drift, which is the growth rate of Qt,σ is the volatil-
ty parameter of Qt, dt is the infinitesimal increment of time, dz
s the standard Wiener increment, dz = ε√dt, ε∼N(0, 1)
A positive drift indicates, among others, an increase in the
mployee’s productivity over time in the profession. The model
ill use as base scenario a volatility of 30% per year, but since the
olatility of the quantity that an employee sells depends on the
egment in which the company operates, a sensitivity analysis
sing the parameters of 10%, 20%, and 40% per year will also be
erformed. In order to understand the magnitude of such levels
f volatility, note that the volatility of the annual revenue of the
rewery company Ambev S/A, the largest Brazilian publicly
raded company by market capitalization, was 5.4% per year
rom 2007 to 2015.
The value of 30% per year was used for the base sce-
ario because it is expected that the volatility of the quantity
arginally sold by the employee is greater than the volatil-
ty of the company’s revenue, since the company is nothing
ut a portfolio of employees. Furthermore, the volatility of the
emand is not the only factor that influences the performance
f the employee, since there are factors that are intrinsic to the
mployee that determine his ability to offer adequate services.
The asset’s expected cash flow of the model is the employer’s
nitial expectation, even though done intuitively, regarding the
arginal benefit that the employee will bring the company. The
alues of the flow may change as time passes because new
nformation will emerge and the environment will change. Such
npredictable events create volatility in the value of the expected
arginal benefit and these may be events that are intrinsic or
xtrinsic to the employee.
Note that this volatility is different for different companies.
robably, there is a positive correlation between it and the volatil-
ty of the company’s revenue. Imagine the case of an employee
f an oil exploration company. If the company is already in the
rocess of extracting oil, the volatility of the marginal benefit
xpected of your employee is less than if the same company is
till in the pre-operational drilling phase, because, in this latter
ase, if the company concludes that the extraction is infeasible,
he marginal benefit of the employee will be zero minus his
xpense to the company, which is negative. But if the drilling is
ollowed by a successful oil extraction, probably the marginal
enefit of the employee will be positive.Other important factors that cause volatility are the intrinsic
ssues of the employee himself. During the selection phase, it is
ommon for the applicants to present themselves as the best solu-
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xpected marginal benefit, but, generally, the employer is aware
hat the impetus of the candidates in this phase is higher than it
ill be for their actual work. The employer seeks to select the
est candidate, however after hiring, some people change their
ttitude in such a way that they can become problematic employ-
es for the company, and can adversely affect the performance
f their colleagues. This employee will end up being replaced
y another, given that the expected marginal benefit of a new
mployee will be greater than the expected marginal benefit of
he problematic employee.
However, when dismissing a problematic employee, it is pos-
ible that the dismissal is filed as a termination of employment
ontract with just cause, in which case the company would be
xempt from paying the FGTS fine and notice. Thus, the result
f this model is much more sensitive to the volatility generated
y extrinsic factors to the employee than generated by the other
actors.
The employee’s effort to sell and, especially the volatility
f the demand will be important factors affecting the volatility
f the quantity sold. The cash flow expectation will depend,
owever, on the expectation of the quantity marginally sold by
his salesperson, which is already discounted of any effect of a
ales cannibalization of some colleague in the company.
It is assumed that the expectation of the quantity sold in
arginal terms will be 50,000 units in the first quarter. The
elling price of each unit will be R$ 1.00. Since it will also
e corrected for inflation, it will be fixed in the model. Thus,
he expectation of the marginal contribution margin for the first
uarter, without considering the costs of the employee’s salary,
ill be R$ 30,000.00 in the first quarter.
t=0(Rt=1) = 50, 000 × 1 = 50, 000
t=0(MCt=1) = 60% × 50, 000 = 30, 000
here Et=0(Rt=1) is the expectation when hiring of R for the next
uarter and Et=0(MgContribt=1) is the expectation when hiring
f MC for the next quarter.
Thus, the employee’s marginal cash flow for the company
n a given quarter can be calculated by taking the contribution
argin in the quarter t and subtract the salary cost and the other
abor charges mentioned in the previous subsection. The sum of
hese costs is initially equivalent to R$ 10,000.00 per month or
$ 30,000.00 in the first quarter. This means that the expected
ash flow for the first quarter will be zero, and have positive
alues for the subsequent quarters due to the positive drift. Since
he analysis is entirely based on the marginal effect of hiring
mployees, the fixed costs of the company are not considered.
inomial tree modeling of the options of dismissal and
raduate incentive
The discount rate of the cash flow chosen for the analysis
ill be 10% per year in real terms, of which 5% per year is theisk-free rate in real terms and the rest is the risk premium also
n real terms. The choice of these rate values is justified by the
esire to represent the values observed in the Brazilian economy
n the last decade.






















































10% R$ 13.65 0.19% 9.0%
20% R$ 26.49 0.37% 10.3%
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As mentioned before, the uncertain variable modeled using
he Cox et al. (1979) model, is Qt, or the amount of units
arginally sold by the employee. Thus, the risk-neutral bino-
ial tree that mirrors the real tree, according to arbitrage-free
ssumptions, should have a risk neutral drift μ of 1.53% per
ear. This (μ) value was obtained by extrapolation and has the
roperty of matching the risk-neutral NPV (discounted at the
isk free rate) with a drift of μ for Qt, to the risk adjusted NPV
discounted at the risk adjusted rate) with a risk neutral drift of
% and, using the approach of Freitas and Brandão (2010).
The following parameters were obtained using these param-









u − d = 0.475
As the uncertainty modeled in the binomial tree is Qt, the
uantity of goods sold marginally and applying Eq. (9), these
enerate directly the Marginal Contribution revenue MC of the
mployee, which is ultimately the employee free cash flow to
he company. So after calculating the binomial tree of Qt, with
9) a second lattice is directly obtained for corresponding MCt.
t the end of this MC lattice we start exerting the option of
aximization with Eq. (11) which is similar to (4), but for the
mployees generated Cash Flow to the company.
Ct = max[Xt ; (MC+t+1 × p + MC−t+1 × (1 − p))e−rΔt] (11)
Therefore, this lattice model has no dividend yield since it
lready is a Cash Flow Lattice. At the end of the 40th quarter
eriod, the options are exercised and then discounted backwards,
hecking exercise or continuation at each period and nod, until
ime 0, where the expanded value is found. Both options (Put and
all) were calculated using similar models of binomial trees (or
attice), the difference laying in the benefit incurred with each
ne of the options modeled.
esults and sensitivity analysis
For the worker analyzed under the aforementioned assump-
ions, the marginal net present value of the cash flows for the
ime span of the case studied (ten years after hiring in quarter
eriods, as cited in Table 1) by the discounted cash flow method
s R$ 39,400. This value disregards the real option of laying
n employee off during that period, which is similar to cases






If the employer had free possibility to dismiss the employee
ithout paying severance fines, which means in the presence
30f the real option of unrestricted dismissal without costs for its
xercise, the net present value would increase by 262% to R$
43,000. Thus, the value of the real option of dismissing the





40% R$ 38.61 0.54% 10.0%
ource: Authors.
In the Brazilian case, when there is an indemnified prior
otice and the FGTS fine to be paid to the employee, the net
resent value increases less to R$ 127,900. Thus, the value of
he real option of dismissal with costs for its exercise is worth
$ 88,400, which is equivalent to 14.6% less than the real option
f dismissal in the absence of severance costs of FGTS fine and
roportional prior notice indemnified.
Labor rights of indemnified prior notice and FGTS fine
ogether result in the loss of R$ 15,100 in the employee’s value
or the company, which is equivalent to 10.6% of the employee’s
PV, whose employer holds the option to unrestricted dismissal.
lthough these severance expenses have their merit as described
n this work, it is important to consider that if they did not exist,
he salary of the employee analyzed in this model could be R$
525.85, instead of R$ 7200.00, which is 4.5% higher that would
esult in the same loss of net present value for the company. It
hould be noted that this salary increase would also increase the
ayment of labor costs in 4.5% to the government and to the
mployee himself, such as INSS, FGTS and 13th salary. There-
ore, it could bring these other benefits to both without loss to the
ompany in terms of present value of cash flows, in accordance
ith the model’s premises.
Figs. 3 and 4 respectively show the results obtained concern-
ng the value of real options analyzed and the salary increase.
n order to analyze the sensitivity of the results to the volatility
f the employee’s productivity, the results are shown for four
ifferent scenarios of annual volatility.
Note that, when performing the same analysis considering the
rior notice of 30 days regardless of the employee’s length of
ervice in the company, which is what occurred in Brazil before
he publication of Law 12,506/11, the following result is reached
s expressed in Figs. 5 and 6.
Thus, it becomes possible to estimate the impact arising from
ntroducing the 3-day increase per year of service on the basis
f calculating the indemnified prior notice. Simply take the dif-
erences between the values of the figures presented above, as
an be seen in Table 2.
The model also allows you to calculate the loss of the
mployee’s net present value analyzed in relation to the exclusive
unction of the FGTS fine. Thus, it will be assumed that there is
o need for a prior notice and that the employment agreement is
nded as soon as the employer decides to do so, without a need
f indemnity for the subsequent month nor payment of payroll
harges such as the deposit of FGTS. It can also be noticed that
he amount of the FGTS fine itself in this scenario will be slightly
ower since there will be no payment of FGTS by the period of

























Costless dismissal option value
Costly dismissal option value
NPV lost due to Brazilian dismissal costs























































Salary - Costless dismissal option





















program for graduate studies into an imposition causes a lossFig. 4. Increase of salary equivalent to the differenc
Sourc
he prior notice. In Fig. 7, one can notice the marginal effect
f each labor rule on the employee’s salary, by equivalence of
PV.
The establishment of a financial support program for graduate
tudies along the lines presented in the previous section (cost of
$ 30,000 covered by the employer, resulting in an increase in
mployee productivity 50% and a salary increase of 66%) can
ncrease the employee’s NPV provided that the decision is taken
t the right time. If the employer offers the program regardless
f the employee’s performance and early in his career in the
ompany, the employee’s NPV calculated without real options
o
t
lue between the real options of dismissal analyzed.
hors.
ould fall from R$ 39,500 to −R$ 68,500, mainly reflecting the
ncrease in the cost of the employee’s salary.
It should be noted that this decision is not the most appropri-
te for this case under analysis because in this way the company
ould renounce the real option of offering the incentive only
o those employees that it has an expectation that they will
ring a financial return on the investment made of paying for
he graduate studies course. The transformation of the incentivef net present value of R$ 107,900 to the employee analyzed in
his study.
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Salary - Costless dismissal option
Salary - Costly dismissal option
Relative difference




















If the company decides to offer incentives to graduate stud-
es only to employees in which it has the expectation that they
ill bring a financial return on this investment and at the time
o maximize their net present value, a gain of R$ 40,000 can
e reached in the absence of the possibility of the employee’s
ismissal, thus increasing the NPV by 101%, from R$ 39,500
o R$ 79,400.
Because private companies not only set up the option to
nstitute incentive programs for graduate studies, but also main-
ain the option of dismissal in Brazil, even with the payment
f severance costs cited in this study, it is best to analyze






ismissal in both cases of the employer covering the costs
r not.
It can be noticed, based on the results presented in
igs. 81. and 8.2, that the options have a high added value with-
ut meaning that the existence of the two jointly significantly
ubtract a value mutually. In fact, the sum of the values of the
ptions calculated separately is less than 5% greater than their
oint value, as can be seen in Tables 3–6. This is expected consid-
ring that they are options exercised in opposite situations with
low overlap between the regions of exercise: the layoff occurs
hen the employee does not have good productivity, while the
nvestment in graduate studies is offered to high performance

























FGTS fine only FGTS Fine+ 30 days notice FGTS fine + notice
Fig. 7. Analysis of the loss of salary equivalence arising from the FGTS fine.
Source: Authors.

















NPV without graduate option Option value NPV with graduate option
Fig. 8.1. Analysis of sensitivity to volatility on the employee’s NPV for the company and on the value of the option of graduate study incentives (without the option
of dismissal).
Source: Authors.





















NPV without graduate option Option value NPV with graduate option
Fig. 8.2. Analysis of sensitivity to volatility on the employee’s NPV for the company and on the value of the option of graduate study incentives (with the option of
d
S
ismissal with severance costs).
ource: Authors.
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Table 3
Value of the model’s options under a volatility assumption of 10% p.a.
Type of option Amount (in
thousands)
1 Option of unrestricted dismissal R$ 23.2
2 Option of dismissal only with FGTS fine R$ 18.0
3 Option of dismissal with FGTS fine and
indemnified 30-day prior notice
R$ 14.9
4 Option of dismissal with FGTS fine and
indemnified proportional prior notice
R$ 14.1
5 Option of graduate studies R$ 2.9
6 Option 1 and 5 jointly R$ 26.1
7 Option 4 and 5 jointly R$ 17.0
Source: Authors.
Table 4
Value of the model’s options under a volatility assumption of 20% p.a.
Type of option Amount (in
thousands)
1 Option of unrestricted dismissal R$ 63.3
2 Option of dismissal only with FGTS fine R$ 56.1
3 Option of dismissal with FGTS fine and
indemnified 30-day prior notice
R$ 51.3
4 Option of dismissal with FGTS fine and
indemnified proportional prior notice
R$ 50.0
5 Option of graduate studies R$ 19.2
6 Option 1 and 5 jointly R$ 81.6
7 Option 4 and 5 jointly R$ 68.7
Source: Authors.
Table 5
Value of the model’s options under a volatility assumption of 30% p.a.
Type of option Amount (in
thousands)
1 Option of unrestricted dismissal R$ 103.5
2 Option of dismissal only with FGTS fine R$ 95.5
3 Option of dismissal with FGTS fine and
indemnified 30-day prior notice
R$ 89.9
4 Option of dismissal with FGTS fine and
indemnified proportional prior notice
R$ 88.4
5 Option of graduate studies R$ 40.0
6 Option 1 and 5 jointly R$ 140.6
7 Option 4 and 5 jointly R$ 126.3
Source: Authors.
Table 6
Value of the model’s options under a volatility assumption of 40% p.a.
Type of option Amount (in
thousands)
1 Option of unrestricted dismissal R$ 142.6
2 Option of dismissal only with FGTS fine R$ 134.2
3 Option of dismissal with FGTS fine and
indemnified 30-day prior notice
R$ 127.9
4 Option of dismissal with FGTS fine and
indemnified proportional prior notice
R$ 126.4
5 Option of graduate studies R$ 61.7
6 Option 1 and 5 jointly R$ 198.7
7 Option 4 and 5 jointly R$ 183.5
Source: Authors.
Table 7
Sensitivity analysis of the parameters of the graduate studies in increasing the
employee’s NPV for the company (amounts in thousands).
Salary increase Increase in yield
33% 50% 66%
33% R$ 36.9 R$ 108.9 R$ 204.7











































66% R$ 11.6 R$ 40.0 R$ 85.0
ource: Authors.
mployees. On the other hand, one option absorbs some value
rom the other because there is the possibility, though remote,
hat the employee attending graduate school will afterwards have
performance lower than expected while his salary becomes
igher, which by law cannot be reduced. In this scenario, the
ompany would exercise both options: first, to invest R$ 30,000
n the employee’s graduate studies and later dismiss him without
ust cause in order to maximize the NPV.
It can also be observed, as expected, that the volatility of the
mployee’s productivity exerts a wide difference on the results,
hile it is important that every employer properly assess this
arameter, even if intuitively, in order to make the best decision.
Finally, it should be pointed out that a graduate course can
mpact differently the performance and the salary of a profes-
ional. Different careers are affected in different ways, which
akes it important that this study analyzes the different param-
ters for the salary increase and to increase the employee’s
erformance. Their impact on the employee’s NPV for the com-
any can be seen in the following table, considering a volatility
f 30% per year and an investment of R$ 30,000 by the company
Table 7).
onclusions
Even though the legal imposition of costs when dismiss-
ng employees without just cause brings a financial benefit to
mployees and their families at a moment they are economi-
ally weak, as well as it being a factor that can protect jobs
uring recessionary times, this study suggests that, on the other
and, it partially removes the employee’s economic value. This
an cause the company to not hire the potential employee or to
imit the salary being offered to a lower level than compared to
he situation in which the dismissal without just cause is free of
xtra costs, especially in sectors of the economy where there is
high volatility in revenues.
The situation in which the company decides not to hire an
mployee can occur when, although intuitively, the employer
onsiders that the net present value is negative for the company
hen hiring the employee. As the study shows for a base case
n Brazil, the decline in the net present value of the employee
or the company can be significant in the presence of costs when
erminating the work contract, which can cause an employee
ith a potential positive NPV (that may be contracted) into anmployee that is no longer wanted. When analyzing the economy
s a whole, one can infer, therefore, that the existence of these



























































































Cox, J., Ross, S., & Rubinstein, M. (1979). Option pricing: A simplified
approach. Journal of Financial Economics, 7(3), 229–263.
Dieese. (2016). Rotatividade no mercado de trabalho brasileiro: 2002 a 2014.66 J.V. Perufo et al. / RAUSP Man
In the base case studied, the fall in NPV due to the existence
f indemnified prior notice proportional to length of service and
he FGTS fine is R$ 15,100, which is equivalent to more than the
onthly wages of two employees. By applying the methodology
o the case of the same employee under the labor legislation
revious to the publication of Law 12,506/11, which is with
rior notice of 30 days regardless of length of service, then there
s decline in the NPV of R$ 13,600. The difference of R$ 1500
an be attributed to the new rules that were introduced with the
roportional prior notice that expanded the prior notice by three
ays for each full year of service provided by the employee to
he company.
In cases where, regardless of the existence of severance costs,
he employee’s NPV is positive for the company (only vary-
ng the amount), the results of this study may suggest that the
mployee could demand a higher salary in the situation where
here are no severance expenses when exercising the option to
ismiss the employee. In the base case studied, if the salary
and other compulsory labor amounts) of the employee that
an be dismissed by the company without severance costs were
ncreased by 4.5%, his NPV would be equal to that of the
mployee with severance costs. This implies that the loss in
alue of the monthly salary arising from the existence of the
GTS fine (40% for the employee and 10% for the govern-
ent) and the indemnified proportional prior notice is 4.3%. If
he prior notice were 30 days regardless of length of service, the
oss would be 3.9%. If there were just the FGTS fine as severance
osts, the salary loss would be 2.3%.
It should be noted, however, that this study sought to analyze
he corporate decisions of hiring an employee and termination of
work contract without just cause considering only the finan-
ial aspect. However, there are several emotional factors that
nfluence the decision to hire and dismiss a worker. One of them
s that many employers find it difficult to let their employees
now about their dismissal because it usually implies in great
conomic hardship for the worker’s family. Furthermore, the
ismissal of one or more employees of a company entails in
reduction in the morale of the other employees, which nega-
ively impacts the organizational climate and hence productivity.
ecause of this, some employers might postpone the decision to
ismiss an employee even if the delay may seem economically
isadvantageous to the company.
Regarding the graduate study incentive program in which the
ompany is willing to pay all or part of the cost of a graduate
ourse for an employee, this study shows that the offer of the
enefit only for the best performing employees offers a positive
verage return while the indiscriminate offering to all employees
n the beginning of their career can result in a negative NPV.
The establishment of a graduate study incentive program with
ost and effects as presented in this model may increase the
mployee’s NPV by R$ 40,000 if the company decides to offer
he benefit only to employees that are expected to come to bring a
nancial return on this investment and at a time that maximizesheir net present value. This means more than five times the
alary of the employee in question.
On the other hand, if the employer offers the program regard-
ess of the employee’s performance and early in his career in thent Journal 53 (2018) 253–267
ompany, the employee’s NPV calculated without real options
ould fall from R$ 39,500 to −R$ 68,500, mainly reflecting
he increase in the cost of the employee’s salary in the model.
herefore, this decision is not the most appropriate for this case
nder analysis because in this way the company would renounce
he real option of offering the incentive only to those employees
hat it has an expectation that they will bring a financial return on
he investment made of paying for the graduate studies course.
he transformation of the incentive program for graduate stud-
es into an imposition causes a loss of net present value of R$
07,900 to the employee analyzed in this study instead of a gain
f R$ 40,000.
Some limitations are present in the methodology presented.
he model assumes that the worker’s remuneration is fixed,
ith no variable part. However, it is common for companies to
ffer variable compensation. This restriction was imposed solely
ecause of wanting to calculate the FGTS fine analytically in the
inomial model. When examining only other types of costs of
xercising the option of dismissal or when using a Monte Carlo
imulation, this restriction can be made flexible. Furthermore,
he model does not consider the employee’s salary progression.
he impacts on the company’s organizational climate due to
aying off employees were also not considered. This implies
n an extra cost since in order to prevent or reverse a worsen-
ng in the organizational climate, the company will incur more
xpenses.
Although severance costs may decrease employee’s net
resent value for the company, including making the salary lower
han it would be if there were no such costs, this paper does not
uggest that the protection of dismissal without just cause is bad
or the employee or for the economy, since the benefits of these
easures were not analyzed.
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